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SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER A
PREEXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
MISINTERPRETS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
AND SETS A HARMFUL PRECEDENT
KEVIN A. TETERS*
IN LOCAL 348-S v. Meridian Management Corp., the Second Cir-
cuit held that a successor employer has a duty to arbitrate the
issue of whether it is bound by the substantive terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement (CBA) between the predecessor em-
ployer and its employees.' In so holding, the Second Circuit
appears to have confused the facts of this case with the more
restrictive situations in which the Supreme Court has stated that
a new employer has a duty to arbitrate disputes over a CBA to
which it was not a party.2 In fact, the court's decision to force
Meridian Management Corporation (Meridian) to arbitrate this
issue was superfluous since the Supreme Court has already
stated that successor employers are "not bound by the substan-
tive provisions of a collective-bargaining contract" under circum-
stances virtually identical to this case. Moreover, the Second
Circuit's policy justification to protect employees' interests may
in fact cause an ironic result in that it sends a message to succes-
sor employers that they can avoid all obligation under the ex-
isting CBA, including a duty to arbitrate disputes, by firing the
majority of the employees upon takeover.4 Accordingly, the ap-
propriate decision in this case would have been to reverse the
judgment of the district court and hold that Meridian is not
bound by the arbitration provision of the CBA.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2012; Bachelor of Business
Administration-Marketing, Texas A&M University, magna cum laude, 2004.
1 583 F.3d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 2010).
2 See generally John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
3 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 284 (1972).
4 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 85-86 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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In October 2003, Meridian was awarded a three-year contract
by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Author-
ity) to provide, among other things, janitorial services at the Ja-
maica Air Train Terminal in JFK International Airport.5
Meridian subcontracted the janitorial work with Cristi Cleaning
Services, Inc. (Cristi), whose unionized janitorial employees
were already represented by Local 348-S, UFCW, AFL-CIO (Lo-
cal 348).6 The preexisting CBA between Cristi and Local 348
required Cristi to contribute to the union's Health and Welfare
Fund, as well as arbitrate all disputes between the parties.7 In
November 2005, Meridian lawfully terminated its contract with
Cristi and, after receiving multiple bids from other cleaning ser-
vices, decided to provide the janitorial services itself.8 Meridian
retained roughly three-quarters of the Cristi employees who had
previously performed the janitorial services at the terminal.9 In
response, Local 348 requested that Meridian recognize it as the
employees' bargaining representative.' ° Meridian, however, de-
clined to do so, and accordingly did not make any contributions
to the union's Health and Welfare Fund.1
Local 348 sued Meridian under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in January 2006.12 The complaint alleged that "there had
been a continuation of the Cristi cleaning services work at the
terminal" and that Local 348's employees "had continuously
performed that work by the same methods.' 3 Therefore, Local
348 argued that Meridian had "assumed Cristi's obligations
under the CBA and.., had a duty to contribute to the Fund.' 4
Additionally, Local 348 complained that Meridian had failed to
make such required contributions.'5 Both parties subsequently
moved for summary judgment, with Local 348 requesting that
the court compel Meridian to submit to arbitration as required
by the CBA, and Meridian arguing that it was not a party to the




9 Id. at 66, 75.
10 Id. at 66-67.
11 Id. at 67.
12 Id.





CBA and was thus not bound by any of its terms, including the
arbitration clause. 16 Finding that Meridian was a "successor em-
ployer," the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Local 348 and ordered Meridian to arbitrate to what extent the
substantive terms of the CBA bound Meridian.1 7 Meridian im-
mediately appealed the district court's ruling.'8
On appeal, Meridian did not contest the district court's find-
ing that it was a successor employer to Cristi.19 Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit was left to decide: (1) whether Meridian was bound
by the CBA's arbitration clause; and (2) whether Meridian was
bound by some or all of the substantive terms contained in the
CBA.20 The majority found that, depending on the circum-
stances, a successor employer may or may not be bound by the
substantive terms of an agreement between the predecessor em-
ployer and its employees' union, but declined to answer
whether Meridian was so obligated in this situation.2 1 Instead,
the court held that Meridian had a duty under the CBA to sub-
mit this issue to arbitration because there was a "substantial con-
tinuity of identity of the workforce" between Meridian and
Cristi.22 The majority's justification was that Meridian had hired
a majority of Cristi's workforce, and that these employees had
"essentially work[ed] for Meridian" from the beginning.23
Moreover, after analyzing a string of circumstantially similar Su-
preme Court cases, the majority concluded that its decision was
consistent with established precedent and that requiring Merid-
ian to arbitrate was the best way to balance its interests with
those of its newly-acquired employees.24
The first case the majority discussed was John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, in which a corporation merged with a second
corporation that had a CBA with its unionized employees.25 In
Wiley, the Supreme Court used federal labor laws supported by
local state law principles to address whether the merged em-
ployer had a duty to arbitrate under the disappearing corpora-
16 Id.
17 Id. at 66-67.
18 See id. at 67.
19 Id. at 68.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 76-77.
22 Id. at 76.
23 Id. at 74.
24 Id. at 78.
25 Id. at 68-69 (discussing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
544-45 (1964)).
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tion's preexisting CBA.26 Despite the merged employer's
contention that it was never a party to the CBA, and therefore
had no duty to recognize or bargain with the employees' union,
the Supreme Court required it to arbitrate its dispute, stating
that "a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary con-
tract" but a "generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. ' 27 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court noted that in merger situations, resolving disputes
with arbitration generally eases the managerial transition for the
employees and helps to avoid "industrial strife. 28
The majority next cited NLRB v. Burns International Security
Services, Inc., an earlier Second Circuit case in which the court
decided-and the Supreme Court affirmed-that a subsequent
employer was not bound by the substantive terms of a CBA be-
tween the predecessor employer and the employees it had re-
tained.29 Similar to the facts in the instant case, the new
employer in Burns outbid its predecessor for the latest contract
to provide security services to a third party and, upon com-
mencement of the work, chose to hire the majority of the prede-
cessor's employees to perform the same work as they had for the
predecessor employer.30 The Supreme Court noted that the
new employer was obligated to recognize and bargain with the
union because it hired the majority of its predecessor's employ-
ees, but specifically held that such employers "are not bound by
the substantive provisions of a collective-bargaining contract ne-
gotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by
them."3
The majority then discussed the Supreme Court's holding in
Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees where the
successor employer only retained twenty percent of the prede-
cessor's employees and thus did not have a duty to arbitrate
under the preexisting CBA.32 The Supreme Court distinguished
this holding from that in Wiley on two grounds: (1) in this case
the predecessor employer remained a viable entity after its suc-
26 John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548.
27 Id. at 550.
28 Id. at 549.
2 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 69-70 (discussing NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1972)).
30 Burns, 406 U.S. at 274-76.
31 Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
32 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 70-72 (discussing Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and
Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 249, 262-65 (1974)).
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cessor took over, thus the retained employees had recourse
against the predecessor, which was not an option in Wiley be-
cause the predecessor employer ceased to exist after the merger;
and (2) in Wiley there had been a "substantial continuity of iden-
tity in the business enterprise" in large part because the succes-
sor employer kept all of the employees of the merged
corporation, while in this case the subsequent employer hired
only a small portion of its predecessor's employees.3
With these cases in mind, the majority proceeded to synthe-
size the facts of the instant case with these previous decisions. 4
The court first noted that as in Wiley and unlike Howard Johnson,
Meridian hired the majority of Cristi's workforce, who contin-
ued to do essentially the same work that they had performed for
Cristi.3 5 Furthermore, the majority found there was a "substan-
tial continuity of identity" between Meridian and Cristi because
both employers provided the same janitorial services, the em-
ployees performed the same duties at the same location, and
both employers provided the same service to the Port Author-
ity.3 16 In particular, the majority focused on the "key factor" that
the employees had "essentially work[ed] for Meridian" the en-
tire time, stating that "Cristi was simply the middleman. 37
The dissent argued that the majority had misinterpreted the
Supreme Court cases it cited and had thereby confused the issue
of when a successor employer must recognize and bargain with
its new employees' union when it had a duty to arbitrate under a
preexisting CBA.3 8 The dissent's interpretation of these Su-
preme Court decisions was that the "substantial continuity of
identity" test only determined whether there was a duty to recog-
nize and bargain, and even if the new employer had such a duty,
it was only required to arbitrate if there had been a merger, an
assumption of the CBA, or where the two employers were essen-
tially the same entity that only appeared to operate autono-
mously, as when a parent company conducts independent
operations under separate corporations. 39 The dissent con-
cluded that because Meridian did not fall within any of these
33 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257.
34 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 74.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 74-75.
37 Id. at 74.
38 Id. at 78-79 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
39 Id.
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three situations, requiring it to arbitrate was a departure from
well-settled case law.
40
The majority held that requiring Meridian to arbitrate was the
"most effective way to balance those interests recognized by the
Supreme Court," including the employer's right to negotiate its
own terms with the union and the employees' need for stability
and protection of their expectations during the transition.4 1
The majority also rejected Meridian's reliance on the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, which considered an almost identical set of facts as the
instant case and held that because the Supreme Court had al-
ready made it clear that a successor employer would not be
bound by the substantive terms of a preexisting CBA, arbitration
was unnecessary because any award in the union's favor could
not "receive judicial sanction. '4 2 According to the majority, its
sister circuit's opinion ignored the overriding importance of ar-
bitration in balancing the employer's right to negotiate its own
CBA and the employees' need for stability throughout the tran-
sition process from one employer to another.4 3 The dissent,
however, argued that the majority's holding could incentivize
successor employers to not retain their predecessor's employees
to avoid all obligation to the CBA, including arbitration. 44 Ulti-
mately, however, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision to require Meridian to arbitrate whether, and to what
extent, it may be bound by the terms of the CBA between Cristi
and Local 348. 45
In doing so, the majority misinterpreted the Supreme Court
decisions it cited and effectively crafted a new rule that is both
unsupported and dangerous for the very employees it is pur-
ported to protect. The majority apparently deduced from Wiley
that a successor employer is required to arbitrate its duties
under the CBA any time there is a "substantial continuity of
identity"-i.e., when it retains the majority of its predecessor's
employees. 46 Applying this test to the facts of Burns, the succes-
sor employer should have been required to arbitrate since it
40 Id. at 80.
41 Id. at 76 (majority opinion).
42 Id. at 77-78; AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264,
273-74 (3d Cir. 2001).
43 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 78.
4 Id. at 85-86 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Id. at 78 (majority opinion).
46 Id. at 74-76.
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hired the majority of its predecessors employees, who ultimately
performed identical work for their new employer;47 however, in
reality, the Supreme Court held the employer in Burns to no
such obligation.48 The Burns decision clearly indicates that Wiley
did not stand for such a blanket proposition.4 9 In fact, the Su-
preme Court in both Burns and Howard Johnson cautioned
against extending Wiley beyond the factual context of that case,
specifically noting that Wiley was a "narrower holding deal[ing]
with a merger occurring against a background of state law that
embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving
corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corpora-
tion."5 This indicates that a determinative consideration for
mandating arbitration is whether there is a possibility that the
successor employer could be bound by the CBA terms, thus ex-
plaining the opposite outcome in Burns and Wiley."
Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry should have been
whether there was a chance Meridian could have been bound by
the substantive terms of the CBA between Cristi and Local 348.
Because the instant case is substantively indistinguishable from
Burns-where the Supreme Court held that the successor em-
ployer could not be bound by CBA terms-requiring Meridian
to arbitrate was erroneous. Both cases involved a situation
where a service was bid out by a central entity, the original pro-
vider of the service was eventually replaced by another provider,
and the subsequent provider hired several of the first provider's
employees to continue doing the same work at the same loca-
tion.52 The majority attempts to distinguish these two cases on
the ground that Burns involved competitors instead of a contrac-
tor and sub-contractor whereby, it argues, the Cristi employees
had in a sense always worked for Meridian.5" Using this same
reasoning, however, the employees in both cases had always
worked for the central entity that bid the work out initially;54 it is
of no consequence that the money originally passed through an
additional hand in the instant case. Therefore, any attempt to
47 See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 274 (1972).
48 See id. at 281-82.
49 See id. at 286-87.
50 Id. at 286 (emphasis added); see also Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Rest.
Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1974).
51 See Bums, 406 U.S. at 287.
52 Id. at 274-76; Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 66 (2d Cir.
2010).
53 Local 348, 583 F.3d at 74-75.
54 Bums, 406 U.S. 274-75; Local 348, 583 F.3d at 66-67.
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distinguish these cases based on the nature of the relationship
between the employers has no effect on the determinative ques-
tion of whether the successor employer can be bound by the
substantive terms of the CBA.
Finally, the majority's justification that its decision protects
the employees' interests is myopic.5" The long-term effect of
this decision is that it encourages future successor employers to
question whether to retain their predecessors' unionized em-
ployees. Any employer cognizant of this decision who is in a
situation similar to Meridian will undoubtedly weigh the bene-
fits of retaining experienced workers with the possibly lengthy
and expensive pitfalls of litigating, appealing, arbitrating, and
potentially relitigating an erroneous arbitration award.5 6 This
decision assures these employers that they can avoid this hassle
by simply firing their predecessor's employees.57 It therefore
cannot be argued that this holding protects the best interest of
the employees-i.e., to continue to have a job.58
Meridian conceded that it had a duty to recognize and bar-
gain with Local 348 as its employees representative. 59 As part of
this process, the parties would certainly have bargained over Me-
ridian's obligation to contribute to the Health and Welfare
Fund. Thus, requiring that they arbitrate over terms that ulti-
mately would have been negotiated during the bargaining pro-
cess was an unnecessary and expensive step for both parties.
The more prudent holding would thus have been to affirm Me-
ridian's duty to recognize and bargain with Local 348 and man-
date that this occur within a reasonable time period following
the decision.
55 See Local 348, 583 F.3d at 78.
56 See id. at 86 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 79 (majority opinion).
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